Jaehyun Lee

There is growing interest in understanding social structural explanations and many have viewed social structures as the main causes of social outcomes. However, social structures come in various forms and the kinds of explanation they provide differ accordingly. This paper provides a distinction between formal and informal social structures, and identifies an important way in which informal social structures explain speech-related injustices, that is, by virtue of being causal moderators. This work has two aims: (1) to highlight unique features of causal moderators and (2) to identify cases in which informal social structures function as moderating causes.

Abstract: To provide an evolutionary explanation of the human tendency to externalize moral norms, Stanford (2018) suggests an adaptive advantage of externalization: it provides an efficient and effective mechanism to protect our prosocial motivations from exploitation. Many have criticized this view, arguing that externalization is unnecessary to achieve the suggested adaptive advantage, given supposedly more plausible alternatives. Stanford provides an empirical argument against these criticisms. I argue that Stanford’s reply to critics fails for reasons he has previously highlighted in his critiques of others, and that his original position contains resources for an effective response to these criticisms.

Abstract: Current speech act theories focus on how to determine the illocutionary force of an utterance—whether the illocutionary force is determined by the speaker’s intention or the hearer’s uptake. Such a focus assumes that there is a single illocutionary force. This is problematic since certain injustices associated with speech acts can occur solely due to either the speaker’s communicative intention or the hearer’s uptake of the speaker’s intention. If a theory takes the illocutionary force to be determined by the speaker’s intention, it cannot account for the injustice that is constituted by the hearer’s uptake; if the theory takes the illocutionary force to be determined by the hearer’s interpretation, it cannot account for the injustice that is constituted by the speaker’s intention. Therefore, I argue that the nature of the illocutionary force of an utterance is twofold, reflecting the fact that both the speaker’s intention and the hearer’s uptake play distinct and indispensable roles, especially regarding injustices associated with speech acts. Accordingly, I suggest an alternative way of looking at illocutionary acts that focuses on the forces that constitute an illocutionary act: normative illocutionary force and descriptive illocutionary force.